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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp. 1988). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
A. Under Utah Code Ann. S 10-2-424 (1986), is UP&L 
entitled to reimbursement for all facilities dedicated to serving 
the annexed areas? 
1. Were UP&L's substation and generation facilities 
"dedicated" to providing utility service to the annexed 
areas? 
2. What is the appropriate measure of value of UP&L's 
substation and generation facilities under Section 10-2-424, 
and does it include going concern value and the value of 
UP&L's franchise to serve the annexed areas? 
B. If UP&L is not entitled, under Section 10-2-424, to 
compensation for its substation and generation facilities, plus 
going concern value and the value of its franchise, is the stat-
ute unconstitutional, on its face or as applied by the District 
Court, under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Con-
stitution, or Article 1, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution? 
C. Is Logan entitled to acquire ownership of UP&Lfs 
local distribution facilities under Section 10-2-424 upon payment 
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of the fair market value of such facilities as determined by the 
district court? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
U.S. Const, amend, V: 
No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor shall private 
property be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
U.S. Const, amend. XIV, S 1; 
. . . nor shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny 
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws. 
Utah Const, art. I, § 22s 
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for pub-
lic use without just compensation. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-424; 
Whenever the electric consumers of the area being 
annexed are receiving electric utility services from sources 
other than the annexing municipality, the municipality may 
not, without the consent of the electric utility, furnish 
its electric utility services to the electric consumers 
until the municipality has reimbursed the electric utility 
company which previously provided the services for the fair 
market value of those facilities dedicated to provide serv-
ice to the annexed area. If the annexing municipality and 
the electric utility cannot agree on the fair market value, 
it shall be determined by the state court having 
jurisdiction. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature Of The Case, Course Of The Proceedings And The 
Disposition Below 
This appeal involves efforts by Logan City to replace 
Utah Power and Light Company ("UP&L") as the supplier of electric 
utility service to several areas recently annexed by Logan, 
Those annexed areas have historically been within UP&L's service 
territory. 
At issue is the amount of compensation due UP&L under 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-424 ("Section 424") and whether that stat-
ute permits Logan to acquire ownership of UP&L's facilities in 
the annexed areas. 
Logan commenced this action to enjoin UP&L from provid-
ing electric utility service within Logan's boundaries. R. 1-13. 
The initial focus of Logan's complaint was UP&L's service to Utah 
State University, an issue not implicated in this appeal. 
UP&L counter-claimed and raised the issue of Section 
424 and Logan's efforts to replace UP&L in the annexed areas. 
R. 172-192. That portion of the case was governed by a stipu-
lated Pre-trial Order (R. 480-94), which established the follow-
ing issues, among others: 
1. Were UP&L's generation and substation facilities "dedi-
cated" to the annexed areas under Section 424? 
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2. Was UP&L entitled to reimbursement for substation and 
generation facilities serving the annexed areas upon 
Logan's talcing over service to those areas? 
3. What was the appropriate measure of valuation of UP&Lfs 
facilities? 
4. Was UP&L entitled to going concern value and the value 
of its franchise? 
5. If UP&L was not entitled to such reimbursement under 
Section 424, was it entitled to compensation for the 
value of its distribution facilities, going concern 
value and severance damages under the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments to the U.SC Constitution and Art, 1, 
Section 22 of the Utah Constitution? 
6. Was Logan entitled to acquire ownership of UP&Lfs local 
distribution facilities under Section 424? 
During a hearing on August 3, 1988, UP&L presented evi-
dence, largely undisputed, of the value of its facilities, the 
degrees to which they were dedicated to the annexed areas and the 
damage UP&L would sustain in losing the annexed customers. On 
August 9, 1988, the district court issued a three page memorandum 
decision holding that UP&L was entitled to be compensated only 
for local distribution facilities, which had a stipulated value 
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of $117,000. R. 495 - 98. The decision also held that UP&L was 
not entitled to any compensation for substation or generating 
facilities, going concern value, the value of its franchise or 
severance damages. Id. 
On October 24, 1988, the district court entered, over 
UP&Lfs objections (R. 499 - 508), Findings of Fact and Conclu-
sions of Law and a Final Judgment (R. 540 - 47) which ordered 
UP&L, upon Logan's payment of the $117,000, to transfer the 
annexed customers to Logan, and to deliver possession of the 
local distribution facilities to Logan. UP&L sought a stay of 
the judgment from the district court pending this appeal, but was 
refused. R. 563. The $117,000 was paid into court and UP&L 
transferred the customers and local facilities to Logan. R. 562. 
2. Statement Of Facts 
The facts in this case are largely undisputed. Many 
can be determined with reference to the Pre-trial Order (R. 
480-94) and UP&Lfs Trial Brief (R. 429-475). (Pursuant to Para-
graph V.C of the Pre-trial Order (R. 485), Logan accepted as 
undisputed the fair market values UP&L assigned in its Trial 
Brief to its substations and generation facilities). The remain-
ing facts were established during the evidentiary hearing held on 
August 3, 1985. The citations in this brief to "Tr,f refer to the 
transcript of that hearing. 
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UP&L, an investor owned utility company, has been sup-
plying electricity to the unincorporated areas surrounding Logan 
for over 70 years. Tr. 15. At all times relevant to this case 
it held a Franchise from Cache County and a Certificate of Conve-
nience and Necessity from the Public Service Commission granting 
to it the right and imposing upon it the obligation to supply 
electricity to the inhabitants of Cache County until the year 
2016. R. 485, 492-94. (The Franchise and Certificate were 
exhibits to the Pre-trial Order and are attached hereto as Appen-
dices A and B, respectively). Until the trial court ordered UP&L 
to transfer service to Logan, UP&L had been serving the annexed 
areas under that Franchise and Certificate. 
The annexed areas and customer locations appear on the 
map attached to the Pre-trial Order as Exhibit "A"; fifty-five 
commercial and residential customers are included. R. 484, 491. 
The map also depicts UP&Lfs local distribution facilities, i.e., 
the poles, lines, transformers, etc., used in delivering elec-
tricity to the annexed areas. Id. 
Some of those distribution facilities (the "exclusively 
dedicated" distribution facilities) were used exclusively to 
serve the annexed areas, whereas others (the "partially dedi-
cated" distribution facilities) were used partly to serve the 
annexed areas and partly to serve areas remaining outside Logan. 
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Id. The Pre-trial Order established 1) that the partially dedi-
cated and exclusively dedicated distribution facilities were 
"dedicated" under Section 424, and 2) the combined fair market 
value of those facilities under Section 424 (including the pro-
portional value of the partially dedicated distribution facili-
ties) was $117,000.-/ R. 484-85. 
UP&L supplied electricity to the annexed areas with an 
integrated network of facilities; this network extended far 
beyond the poles, lines and other distribution facilities located 
in the annexed areas. Tr. 16 - 17, 41 - 44. The principal com-
ponents of this extended network, for purposes of this case, were 
UP&Lfs state-wide generating facilities, and its three substa-
tions (Millville, North Logan and Nibley) located nearby the 
2/ 
annexed areas.- It was undisputed that .009% of UP&Lfs state-
wide generating capacity was employed in producing electricity 
for the annexed areas. R. 485; Tr. 44; Ex. D-l. It was also 
undisputed that UP&L employed the three nearby substations in 
This figure assumed that UP&L would keep the partially dedi-
cated distribution facilities in Areas B, C and E of the 
map, and it included any re-routing costs UP&L might incur 
in continuing to operate its remaining distribution facili-
ties. R. 485 
UP&L did not claim compensation for its high voltage trans-
mission facilities because they will wheel, at compensatory 
rates, the annexed areas' electricity even if Logan is the 
supplier. Tr. p. 16 1. 8 - 23. 
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order to reduce electricity from transmission level voltage to 
voltage levels that could be distributed to the annexed areas. 
R. 485; Tr. 16 - 17, 19 - 20, 24; Ex. D-l. 
The generally accepted meaning of the term "dedicated", 
as used in the electric utility industry, was not disputed. Syn-
onymous to the regulatory concept of "used and useful", it encom-
passes all facilities directly employed in producing and deliver-
ing electricity to the ultimate consumer. Tr. 40. Even Logan's 
expert conceded that UP&Lfs substations and generation facilities 
were "dedicated" to the extent UP&L used them to supply electric-
ity to the annexed areas. Tr. 90 - 92. 
The values of UP&L's generation, substation, distribu-
tion facilities, based upon reproduction cost less depreciation, 
and allocated according to the percentages to which the facili-
ties were dedicated to the annexed areas, were not disputed by 
Logan. Those values were: 
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Facility 
Generation 
Substation 
Millville 
North Logan 
Nibley 
Distribution 
Excl. Ded. 
Part, Ded. 
Area A 
Area B 
Area C 
Area E 
% Dedicated 
.009 
3.25 
3.04 
.12 
100 
32.77 
12.12 
6.45 
12.12 
Reproduction 
Cost Less 
Depreciation of 
Dedicated Portion 
$211,094 
12,737 
$117,000 
$340,831 
Tr. 44; Ex. D-l. 
UP&L also presented evidence of the added value 
attributable to the above facilities because they constituted a 
"going concern". This going concern value was expressed as the 
present value of the net profits the dedicated facilities would 
generate over time as a result of being engaged in business in 
the annexed areas. Tr. 44 - 52; Ex. D-l. This added value was 
$94,156, resulting in a total fair market value for the dedicated 
facilities of $434,987. Id.; Ex. D-9. Logan presented no evi-
dence to rebut UP&Lfs claim for going concern value. 
Finally, UP&L presented evidence of the damage to its 
substations and generation facilities that would result from the 
severance of the annexed areas from its system. Tr. 57-61. 
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Severance damages were presented as an alternative to computing 
the fair market value of the substations and generation facili-
ties under Section 424. Id. According to UP&L's unrebutted evi-
dence, the proper measure of severance damages was "incurred 
unavoidable costs", i.e., the costs attributable to the dedicated 
facilities that UP&L would continue to incur and could not avoid 
either by idling the facilities or returning them to service 
elsewhere in the system. Id. Those costs included capital car-
rying costs, interest on plant investment, taxes, insurance and 
maintenance; they totalled $5,405 for substation and $127,007 for 
generation. Tr. 60. When added to going concern value ($94,156) 
and the value of the local distribution facilities ($117,000), 
the resulting alternative compensation figure was $343,568. 
Ex. D-10. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Utah Legislature enacted Section 424 to protect 
public utilities and their ratepayers when municipal electrical 
systems expand into annexed areas previously served by public 
utilities. The statute requires the municipality to compensate 
the utility for all facilities "dedicated to provide service to 
the annexed area." The trade usage of "dedicated," which con-
trols the statutory interpretation, covers all property, wherever 
located, to the extent used to provide service to the annexed 
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area. Further, the legislative history shows that the Legisla-
ture was primarily concerned with protecting the remaining 
ratepayers of the public utility, and insuring that they not be 
saddled with costs of facilities made less useful by municipal 
expansion. Section 424 requires Logan to compensate UP&L for all 
of UP&L's facilities, wherever located, to the extent they were 
used to serve the annexed areas. Any other interpretation of the 
statute is contrary to the statutory language and the legislative 
history, and places an unfair burden on UP&L and its ratepayers. 
The district court's erroneous interpretation of Sec-
tion 424 violated UP&L's constitutional right to just compensa-
tion for property damaged or taken. At the very least, UP&L is 
constitutionally entitled to be compensated for the value of its 
expropriated business, including going concern value and the 
value of its franchise, plus severance damage to its remaining 
facilities. 
Finally, the district court erred by awarding Logan 
possession of UP&L's local distribution facilities. Section 424 
does not, expressly or impliedly, give the annexing municipality 
the right to take over the utility's facilities in the annexed 
area. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. SECTION 424 MUST BE INTERPRETED TO REQUIRE COMPENSATION FOR 
ALL DEDICATED FACILITIES WHEREVER LOCATED, INCLUDING UP&L'S 
SUBSTATIONS AND GENERATION FACILITIES. 
The district court's ruling that UP&L was entitled to 
compensation only for its distribution facilities located in the 
annexed areas ignored the plain meaning of Section 424 as well as 
the clear legislative purpose for which the statute was enacted. 
Section 424 is not limited to facilities which happen to be 
located in the territory the municipality has annexed. The stat-
ute provides that if a municipality wishes to provide electrical 
service to customers of a private utility in an annexed area, the 
municipality must first pay to the utility a sum equal to the 
fair market value of the utility's facilities dedicated to pro-
3/ 
vide service to the affected area.— 
2/ 10-2-424. Electric utility service in annexed area. 
Whenever the electric consumers of the area being 
annexed are receiving electric utility services from sources 
other than the annexing municipality, the municipality may 
not, without the consent of the electric utility, furnish 
its electric utility services to the electric consumers 
until the municipality has reimbursed the electric utility 
company which previously provided the services for the fair 
market value of those facilities dedicated to provide serv-
ice to the annexed area. If the annexing municipality and 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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In the present case, UP&L presented evidence, 
unrebutted by Logan, that its integrated network of distribution 
substation and generation facilities, both inside and outside the 
annexed areas, was dedicated to serve those areas. The district 
court's refusal to order compensation for all of those dedicated 
facilities was contrary to the language and intent of the stat-
ute, and contrary to the undisputed evidence. 
A. Background Of The Statute. 
Section 424 was originally enacted in 1983 (1983 Utah 
Laws ch. 247, S 2) in response to disputes between private util-
ity companies and municipalities over service to annexed terri-
tory. See, e.g., CP National Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 
638 P.2d 519 (Utah 1981) (questioning whether municipalities pos-
sessed authority to condemn electrical power system); CP National 
Corp. v. City of St. George, No. C81-0182J slip op. (D. Utah Apr. 
10, 1981) (granting a preliminary injunction preventing a city 
from competing with a certificated utility within an annexed 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
the electric utility cannot agree on the fair market value, 
it shall be determined by the state court having 
jurisdiction. 
Utah Code Ann. S 10-2-424 (1987). 
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area). A 1982 law review article focused attention on the prob-
lem and called for the Legislature to determine (1) who is enti-
tled to provide electrical service to an annexed area, and (2) 
the amount of compensation a utility displaced from an annexed 
area is entitled to receive for the loss of its business. CP 
National Corp. v. Public Service Commission: The Jurisdictional 
Ambiguity Surrounding Municipal Power Systemsr 1982 Utah L. Rev. 
913, 930-932 & n. 144. 
As originally enacted, Section 424 provided a utility 
and its ratepayers two-pronged protection from the loss of busi-
4/ 
ness in annexed territory. - First, Section 424 required an 
i/ As originally enacted in 1983, Section 424 read as follows: 
[W]henever the residents of the area being 
annexed are receiving electric utility serv-
ices from sources other than the annexing 
municipality, the municipality may not with-
out the consent of the electric utility fur-
nish its municipality utility services to 
such residents until the following conditions 
have been satisfied: 
(1) The franchise from the county or 
other political subdivision under which the 
electric utility services were being fur-
nished has expired. 
(2) The municipality has reimbursed the 
electric utility company which previously 
provided such services the fair market value 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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annexing municipality to wait until the expiration of the elec-
tric utility's franchise before providing electrical service. 
1983 Utah Laws ch. 247, § 2 (amended 1985). Second, the statute 
required the municipality to reimburse the electric utility com-
pany for the fair market value of the the utility's facilities 
dedicated to provide service to the annexed area. Fair market 
value was measured by the facility's replacement cost less depre-
ciation. Id. 
Senator Sowards, the sponsor of the 1983 bill in the 
Senate, explained the problems that gave rise to Section 424: 
When a utility is granted a certificate of conve-
nience and necessity to serve a community, they 
not only have to provide facilities, transmission 
facilities in the community, but they have to pro-
vide generation facilities and anticipate for 
years ahead to take care of that community. Now, 
one of the things that has been happening 
recently, is that cities have been annexing some 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
as determined by replacement costs less 
depreciation of its facilities which are ded-
icated to provide service to the annexed 
area. If the annexing municipality and the 
electric utility cannot agree on the fair 
market value, it shall be determined by the 
state court having jurisdiction. 
(3) The provisions of subsection (1) are 
inapplicable if the number of residents 
affected is less than three in the area to be 
annexed. 
1983 Utah Laws ch. 247, S 2 (amended 1985). 
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of the areas that the utility has been serving, 
and then the utility's area has become a no mans 
[sic] land. The question is: Does the utility 
get to continue to serve that? Does the municipal 
entity which has a municipal utility get to serve 
it? Who takes care of the facilities? Who takes 
care of that excess generating capacity that was 
purchased at great cost? 
Transcript of Senate Debate on H.B. 354, 1983 Legis., at 1 (Mar. 
9, 1983); Ex. D-8.-7 
The Legislature amended Section 424 in 1985. The 
amendment removed one of the two safeguards provided to utilities 
in the 1983 enactment, the requirement that an annexing munici-
pality wait until the expiration of the existing utility's fran-
chise before displacing the utility from the annexed area. How-
ever, the amendments retained the language requiring the munici-
pality to compensate the utility for the fair market value of the 
facilities dedicated to providing service to the annexed area. 
The Legislature also broadened the term "fair market value" as 
used in Section 424 by eliminating the reference to reproduction 
cost less depreciation as the sole basis for valuation. 
^/ UP&L introduced into evidence certified copies of tran-
scripts of the Senate and House debates on H.B. 354, 1983 
Legis., and the Senate and House debates on S.B. 191 1985 
Legis. (Exhibits D-5, D-6, D-7, & D-8). 
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B. As Used In Section 424, The Term "Dedicated" Requires 
Reimbursement For Any Facility To The Extent It Is Used 
To Deliver Electricity To The Annexed Area. 
1. The Meaning of "Dedicated" In The Public Utility Indus-
try Controls. 
The general legal meaning of "dedicate" is "to appro-
priate and set apart one's private property to some public use." 
Black's Law Dictionary 371 (5th Ed. 1979); Toledo, Peoria & West-
ern R. R. v. Illinois Dep't of Transp., 547 F. Supp. 140, 141 
(CD. 111. 1982); Corey v. City of San Diego, 329 P.2d 99, 103, 
163 Cal. App. 2d 65 (1958). See also Leo M. Bertaqnole, Inc. v. 
Pine Meadows Ranches, 639 P.2d 211 (Utah 1981) (real property 
dedicated to public use as roadway). Dedication of property to a 
public use does not transfer title to a governmental entity, but 
reserves in the owner of the property all legal rights "compati-
ble with the full exercise and enjoyment of the public use for 
which the property was dedicated." Toledo, Peoria & Western R. 
R. v. Illinois Dep't of Transp., 547 F. Supp. 140, 141 (CD. 111. 
1982) (emphasis added). 
A public utility is a private corporation that dedi-
cates its production and distribution facilities for utility 
service to the public. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-2-1(20) 
(Supp. 1988) (defining public utility) t 54-3-1 (1986) (general 
statement of utility's duty to public). "Dedicated" is 
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synonymous with "used and useful", a term that defines the prop-
erty a utility may include in its rate base (the property upon 
which it is entitled to receive a fair rate of return from its 
ratepayers). "It is only to the extent the facilities are used 
and useful to the consumers that they are included in the rate 
base." Committee on Consumer Serv. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 595 
P.2d 871, 874 (Utah 1979), cert, denied 444 U.S. 1014 (1980). 
See also In re Union Elec. Co., 24 P.U.R. 4th 234, 244-246 (111. 
Commerce Comm'n 1978) (power plant located outside state "dedi-
cated" to Illinois service, therefore, included in rate base). 
See also Tr. 40. 
Where a term used in a statute has a well-known trade 
or business usage, the term is presumed to have been used by the 
legislature in that technical sense. Order of Ry. Conductors v. 
Swan, 329 U.S. 520, 525 (1947) (industry usage of railroad term 
controlled statutory interpretation); Haynie v. Northern Pac. Ry. 
Co., 158 Mont. 247, 490 P.2d 715, 716 (1971) (seismographic 
industry usage controlled construction of statutory term). The 
rule applies to statutes involving utility service as well. 
Simon v. State Examiners of Electricians, 395 Mass. 238, 479 
N.E.2d 649, 652 (1985). 
The uncontroverted testimony before the district court 
established that the term "dedicated" has a specialized trade 
-18-
usage in the electrical utility industry. Orrin Colby, Vice 
President, Controller, and Chief Accounting Officer of UP&L, tes-
tified as follows: 
Q . . .can you say whether or not the term "dedicated for 
service" as it applies to electric utility properties has a 
generally accepted meaning within the utility industry? 
A Yes, it certainly does. 
Q And what is that meaning? 
A There are two ways in which it is generally phrased. 
Either dedicated for service or used and useful. And it 
depends on the jurisdiction that you are in as to how that 
terminology is used. In Wyoming, for example, the "useful" 
concept is or [sic] definition is more commonly used. In 
Utah, "dedicated facilities" is. By that we are talking 
about the facilities of the company and I'm talking here in 
terms of the industry norms and as it's used for regulatory 
purposes in this state. We're talking about the facilities 
of the company from the meter on the customer's premises 
back to the generating station or source of fuel in some 
cases, all of which are dedicated for the purpose of provid-
ing service. And that is the industry norm and the state 
standard that is used for regulatory purposes. 
Tr. 40c Mr* Colby's testimony that the industry usage of the 
term "dedicated" or "dedicated to service" includes all facili-
ties "from the meter on the customer's premises back to the gen-
erating station" was not rebutted by Logan. Logan's expert wit-
ness, Mr. Tone, conceded on cross-examination that to the extent 
a generating facility, substation, or other equipment is used to 
provide service to a customer, the equipment is "dedicated" under 
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the usage of that term in the electric utility industry. Tr. 89 
- 92. 
Thus, there can be no question that UP&Lfs substations 
and generation facilities, as well as its local distribution 
lines, were "dedicated" to serving the annexed areas. Under Sec-
tion 424, the district court was bound to award UP&L the fair 
market value of those dedicated facilities regardless of whether 
they were physically inside or outside the territorial limits of 
Logan. 
2. The Legislative History Of Section 424 Confirms The 
Interpretation That Compensation Is Required For Dedi-
cated Facilities Located Outside The Annexed Area. 
As demonstrated in the preceding section, the term 
"dedicated" as used in Section 424 is unambiguous; it covers all 
facilities used and useful in providing service to the annexed 
areae Accordingly, the Court need look no further than the plain 
meaning of the statute. However, if the Court does look further, 
it will find that the legislative history confirms that plain 
meaning. 
In interpreting legislative history, the comments made 
by sponsors of legislation during legislative debates are given 
particular weight. 2A N. Singer, Sutherland On Statutes And Stat-
utory Construction S 48.15 (4th ed. 1984). See Olson v. Salt 
Lake City School Dist., 724 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1986); Thomas v. 
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Kinqsley, 85 N.J. Super. 357, 204 A.2d 724, 732 (1964), aff'd 43 
N.J. 524, 206 A.2d 161 (1965). 
Senator Sowards, the Senate sponsor of the bill enact-
ing Section 424 in 1983, indicated that the bill's primary pur-
pose was to require reimbursement to a utility for that portion 
of its generating plants that were formerly used to serve the 
annexed area. In his opening statements in introducing House 
Bill 354, he asked rhetorically: "Who takes care of that excess 
generating capacity that was purchased at great cost?" He 
replied: "For this reason the purpose of this bill is to provide 
that electric utilities are fairly paid for their facilities and 
equipment in areas which they are serving when they are annexed 
by a municipality with a system of its own." Transcript of Sen-
ate Debate on H.B. 354, 1983 Legis., at 1, (Ex. D-8). 
Senator Sowards noted that simply allowing a municipal-
ity to displace the utility "leaves the utility without any com-
pensation for the facilities which have been developed to serve 
that area, and places the burden of paying for the unrecovered 
costs on the other ratepayers of the state." Id. at 2. See also 
Id. at 9; (Ex. D-8). 
The 1983 legislative history leaves no doubt that the 
term "dedicated" was intended to include all facilities used to 
produce or deliver electricity to the annexed territory. Since 
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that term did not change in the 1985 amendments, the 1983 history 
governs the interpretation of the statute today. It is signifi-
cant to notef however, that the discussions of the 1985 amend-
ments (which dealt with the expiration of the franchise and the 
measure of fair market value) reaffirm the 1983 history as to the 
meaning of "dedicated." In the House Debates on the 1985 amend-
ment, Representative Jenkins, the House sponsor of the bill, 
responded to a question from Representative Wasden as follows: 
It is not replacement, it's the fair market value 
at that time and the word "dedicated" in there, 
Representative, means not just, sayr the line run-
ning from the telephone pole into the home, its 
also all the lines running all the way back to the 
plant that they get it from and so forth. So its 
those dedicated and its a fair market value. 
Transcript of House Debate on S.B. 191, 1985 Legis., at 2, (Ex. 
D-6) (emphas is added). 
Representative Jenkins also indicated that compensation 
was required for all substations and generating plants that have 
been providing service to the annexed area: 
Representative Cromar: 
Yea, a question to the sponsor. I really don't 
see anywhere in this Bill where the protection is 
to substations. . . . I don't see any protection 
to private companies on their substation and those 
type of things. 
Representative Jenkins: 
That's just what I explained to Representative 
Wasden. The word "dedicated" means anything that 
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happens to be on the line that requires them to 
get the services into their area whether its sub-
stations, whether it's their plant or whatever. 
Id, at 3 (emphasis added). 
This clear evidence of the legislative intent to 
require fair compensation for all of the utility's dedicated 
facilities, substations and plants outside the annexed area is 
further buttressed by the legislature's rejection of an amendment 
that would have narrowed the scope of Section 424, The initial 
version of the 1985 bill had deleted "dedicated" and had substi-
tuted "used exclusively". See S.B. 191. (Ex. D-3).- However, 
when the bill was reported out of the committee to the Senate, 
the committee had reinserted "dedicated". Transcript of Senate 
Debate on S.B. 191, 1985 Legis., at p. 1. (Ex. D-5). The Legis-
lature thus considered and rejected the concept of limiting com-
pensation to only those facilities located within the annexed 
7/ 
territory.-
£' UP&L introduced into evidence certified copies of the 
enrolled copy of 1985 Legislature S.B. 191, the introduced 
copy of S.B. 191, and the two proposed amendments to S.B. 
191 (Ex. D-3). 
1/ Legislative action on a proposed amendment to a bill is rel-
evant to interpreting the statute passed. 2A N. Singer, 
Sutherland on Statutes and Statutory Construction § 48.18 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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3. Fairness And Common Sense Require That Section 424 Be 
Interpreted To Compensate UP&L For All Facilities Used 
To Provide Service. 
Even without considering the plain language of the 
statute and the legislative history of the term "dedicated", Sec-
tion 424 should be interpreted to require compensation for facil-
ities located outside the annexed area to the extent they are 
used to serve the annexed area. 
The purpose of Section 424 is to protect the utility's 
ratepayers from having to absorb the costs of facilities stranded 
by annexation. As Senator Sowards stated: 
[T]he problem is that a lot of times, the cities 
have taken the position when they annex, that they 
have the right to immediately be serving the 
utility's customers in the area of annexation. 
This position leaves the utility without any com-
pensation for the facilities which have been 
developed to serve that area, and places the bur-
den of paying for the unrecovered costs on the 
other ratepayers of the state. Now I think you 
should get that position, because if they lose 
that, then somebody else has to pick it up, and 
this is certainly unfair both to the utility and 
the other ratepayers. 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
(4th ed. 1984). The rejection of a proposed amendment indi-
cates that the legislature did not intend the bill to 
include the effect of the provisions rejected, id.; City of 
Manhattan v. Eriksen, 204 Kan. 150, 460 P.2d 622 (1969). 
See also Donovan v. Hotel, Motel & Restaurant Employees, 700 
F.2d 539, 545 n.8 (9th Cir. 1983). 
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Transcript of Senate Debate, H.B. 54, 1983 Legis., at 2 (Mar. 9, 
1983), (Ex. D-8). 
A common sense interpretation of Section 424 requires 
that the facilities for which a utility is to be compensated not 
be limited to those physically located within the annexed area. 
Electrical systems, by their nature, include distant generating 
plants, transmission lines and substations, in addition to local 
distribution facilities. If 75% of the capacity of a substation 
located outside Logan were being used to serve the annexed area, 
UP&L should be compensated for 75% of the substation. The fact 
that smaller percentages are involved in this case does not alter 
the logic or the necessary result. If Logan can escape compen-
sating UP&L for dedicated facilities for the arbitrary reason 
that the facilities happen to be located outside of the annexed 
boundaries, the burden of paying for those facilities will be 
unfairly shifted to UP&L and its ratepayers. This would invite 
municipalities throughout the state to raid UP&L of its customers 
in adjacent areas and leave it with huge excess generating and 
transmission capacity, to be borne entirely by UP&Lfs remaining 
ratepayers. It cannot be presumed that the Legislature intended 
such a result. 
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4. This Court Should Direct The Trial Court To Award UP&L 
Judgment In The Amount Of $434,987, 
Section 424 requires a municipality to compensate a 
utility for all facilities, wherever located, to the extent dedi-
cated to provide service to customers in the annexed area. 
UP&L's undisputed evidence established that the fair market value 
of UP&L's dedicated facilities, including going concern value, 
was $434,987.00. Tr. 41-52; Ex. D-l, D-9. There being no evi-
dence to controvert the amounts claimed, this Court should direct 
the district court to enter judgment in favor of UP&L in the 
amount of $434,987.00. 
II. LOGAN MAY NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY USE SECTION 424 TO EXPROPRI-
ATE UP&LfS BUSINESS AND PROPERTY FOR LESS THAN LOGAN WOULD 
HAVE PAID HAD IT PROCEEDED BY CONDEMNATION. 
A. The Utah And U.S. Constitutions Require That UP&L 
Receive Compensation For All Property Taken Or Made 
Less Useful. 
The United States Constitution prohibits the taking of 
private property for public use without just compensation. U.S. 
Const, amend. V, amende XIV. The Utah Constitution provides a 
broader protection, prohibiting private property from being 
"taken or damaged" for public use without just compensation. 
Utah Const, art. I, S 22. The trial court's award of compensa-
tion to UP&L for only the value of the physical facilities 
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located in the annexed area violates these constitutional guaran-
tees. 
Although Logan did not commence formal condemnation 
proceedings to acquire UP&Lfs business in the annexed areas, the 
district court used Section 424 to accomplish much the same 
result. The district court's ruling allowed Logan to expropriate 
UP&L's customers and its local distribution lines. The purpose 
and effect of the relief ordered by the district court was virtu-
ally indistinguishable from a partial condemnation of UP&Lfs pub-
lic utility system. UP&L lost its local distribution facilities 
and the going concern value of its business in the annexed areas. 
UP&Lfs substations and generating facilities were damaged by 
being severed from the business they were built to serve. At the 
very least, UP&L must receive the compensation to which it is 
constitutionally entitled for the taking of and damage to its 
business and facilities. 
1. UP&L Is Constitutionally Entitled To The Going Concern 
Value Of Its Business In The Annexed Territory, Includ-
ing The Value Of Its Franchise. 
This Court has never addressed the issue of going con-
cern value in the condemnation of a utility system. However, 
courts in other jurisdictions uniformly recognize that compensa-
tion for the going concern value must be awarded where a utility 
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business is being taken*2. The rationale for this rule is that 
business facilities in active operation have an added value to 
the owner above and beyond their mere "scrap" value, which must 
be taken into account if just compensation is to be awarded. See 
City of Omaha v. Omaha Water Co.r 218 U.S. 180, 203 (1910) ("the 
difference between a dead plant and a live one is a real value"); 
4A Nichols, The Law of Eminent Domain, S 15.44. 
Courts applying the rule in the context of electric 
utilities recognize that going concern value and franchise rights 
See 4A Nichols, The Law of Eminent Domain § 15.41, at pp. 
15-94 (1985) ("when the plant of a public service corpora-
tion is taken by eminent domain, the corporation is not lim-
ited to the value of its physical property, or the cost of 
reproducing the same, but is entitled to be paid the value 
of its franchises and property taken together as a going 
concern and as parts of one system. . . . " ) ; Twin Cities 
Metro. Pub. Transit Area v. Twin City Lines, Inc., 224 N.W. 
2d 121, 126 (1974) (an award of damages for going concern 
value is appropriate for condemnation of public transit 
business); Monaqehela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 
U.S. 312, 326 & 329 (1893) (just compensation under the 
Fifth Amendment requires payment for productiveness of busi-
ness being condemned); In re Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, 219 
N.E.2d 410 (N.Y. App. 1966), remittitur amended, 221 N.E.2d 
174 (N.Y. App. 1966), appeal dismissed, 386 U.S. 778 (1967), 
(going concern value is a required element of just compensa-
tion in condemnation of transit company); City of Tucson v. 
El Rio Water Co., 415 P.2d 872, 876-877 (Ariz. 1966) (going 
concern value, including value of franchise rights, is con-
stitutionally required); Bear Creek Water Assoc, Inc. v. 
Town of Madison, 416 So.2d 399 (Miss. 1982), opinion on 
other issues after removal, 816 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir. 1987), 
dismissed on other grounds, 510 So.2d 800 (Miss. 1987) 
(water company entitled to going concern value of expropri-
ated business). 
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are separate elements of just compensation when a public 
utility's facilities or customers are expropriated by a 
9/ 
municipality.- In City of Newark v. Delmarva Power & Light Co., 
Civil No. 83C-JL-10, slip op. (Del. Super. May 21, 1985) (a copy 
is attached hereto as Appendix C), the City of Newark sought to 
condemn certain distribution facilities of the Delmarva Power & 
Light Company in order to supplant the company in providing elec-
trical service to three customers who had been annexed to the 
city. The power company argued that it was entitled to compensa-
tion not only for its physical properties, but also for the value 
of its franchise and for the going concern and goodwill value of 
its service to the customers. The court agreed, holding that the 
While some courts focus on the valuation of franchise rights 
independently of going concern value, other courts and com-
mentators have noted that the value of any franchise rights 
can be simply added to and considered as part of the overall 
"going concern" value of the business. See In re City of 
Redding, 1919F P.U.R. 415, 420 (Cal. R.R. Comm'n 1919) 
(while a utililty is entitled to be compensated both for 
franchise rights and for going concern value, franchise 
value may be considered as an element of going concern). 
See also City of Omaha v. Omaha Water Co., 218 U.S. 180, 203 
(1910) (going concern value exists apart from the value of 
any franchise); Flecha Caida Water Co. v. City of Tucson, 
420 P.2d 198, 201 (Ariz.App. 1966) (even where business is 
not a going concern, franchise is compensable). See gener-
ally, Orgel, Valuation Under Eminent Domain, S 214-216 (2d 
ed. 1953) (discussing compensation for franchise rights and 
going concern value). 
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company's franchise was a property right that included the going 
concern value of the business. 
In a similar case involving a city's expropriation of 
facilities used by the Mississippi Power & Light Company ("MP&L") 
to provide service inside a city's limits, the Mississippi 
Supreme Court held that just compensation included the value of 
the company's operating rights: 
MP&L's franchise to serve Planters is valuable 
property, and its protection against being taken 
for public use cannot be vouchsafed by the consti-
tution the same as any other property. 
Clarksdale's statutory right to condemn MP&L's 
facility cannot be construed in contravention of 
MP&L's right to have its franchise protected 
against expropriation without just 
compensation. . . . 
Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. City of Clarksdale, 288 So.2d 9 
(Miss. 1973). 
In City of Thibodaux v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 
225 F. Supp. 657 (E.D. La. 1963), aff'd in part and rev'd in 
part, 373 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1967), cert, denied, 389 U.S. 975 
(1967), the federal district court for the District of Louisiana 
also held that a municipality that takes over a public utility 
business in an annexed area must provide compensation for the 
going concern value of the business. The court distinguished the 
condemnation of a public utility from typical real estate condem-
nation, and held that just compensation included the value of the 
-30-
utility's franchise right to provide service in the annexed area. 
The court reasoned: 
• . • the instant situation presents a different 
case. The city is seizing this property to use it 
in the same manner and for the same purpose as its 
present use. The city is in fact seizing a going 
business to continue it as a going business. . . . 
The city is not buying the poles, lines and equip-
ment to clear them away and build a school. The 
city wants the power company's distribution system 
and its customers. . . . 
The law of Louisiana says that when a state builds 
a road and must destroy a gasoline station to do 
it the state need not pay for a gasoline station 
because the land and a building is what it wants 
and what it gets, not a gasoline station 
business. . . . The judgment of this court, 
throughout this litigation, has consistently been 
that when it is the business itself that is being 
seized, it must be valued in the only way that 
businesses can be valued, i.e., according to its 
ability to produce income. (emphasis added). 
id. at 667. 
The cases cited and discussed above leave no doubt that 
UP&L is constitutionally entitled to recover, in addition to fair 
market value of its physical facilities, the going concern value, 
including the franchise, arising from the fact that the expropri-
ated facilities and customers are part of an active business 
operation. A constitutional interpretation of Section 424 can 
provide nothing less. 
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2. UP&L Is Constitutionally Entitled To Compensation For 
Severance Damage, i.e., Damage To Its Remaining Facili-
ties Resulting From Logan's Expropriation Of The 
Annexed Customers And Local Distribution Lines. 
The Utah and United States Constitutions also require 
that UP&L receive compensation from Logan at least for the damage 
caused by the severance of the annexed customers and local dis-
tribution lines from the remainder of UP&L?s system. 
There is no Utah case law addressing severance damages 
for the partial condemnation of a public utility system or other 
active business operation. However, Utah law mandates severance 
damages whenever part of a "bundle" of property rights or a sin-
gle economic unit is condemned, and the remaining property is 
thereby reduced in value or made useless. See, e.g., State v. 
Williams, 22 Utah 2d 301, 452 P.2d 548 (1969) (upholding award of 
severance damages for two noncontiguous parcels of real property, 
based on evidence that the taken parcel and the two remaining 
parcels were used as part of an integrated ranching operation); 
Provo City Corp. v. Knudsen, 558 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1977) (upholding 
an award of severance damage to real property caused by the tak-
ing of an aerial easement, over city's objection that physical 
severance of a parcel of real property was required). 
Moreover, in North Salt Lake v. St. Joseph Water & 
Irrigation Co., 118 Utah 600, 223 P.2d 577 (1950), this Court 
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recognized in dicta that upon the partial condemnation of a water 
system, the condemning authority is liable for severance damages 
to the remainder of the system. The Court stated: 
[i]t has been held that if a condemnor seeks to 
condemn only part of a system, it is liable for 
the amount it depreciates the remaining 
portion. . . . 
223 P.2d at 584. 
The weight of authority in other jurisdictions supports 
the award of severance damage in partial condemnations of utility 
systems. In In re Sacramento Municipal Utility District, 48 
P.U.R. (NS) 322, 337 (1942), the California Railroad Commission, 
in addressing the amount and elements of compensation required in 
the partial condemnation of distribution facilities of an elec-
tric utility, stated: 
[i]n practical effect, the act of severance 
involves the element of violence, with attendant 
injury to the system from which the part is sev-
ered. In any given case, the severance is 
attended by partial disability, at least, with 
respect to the remaining portion, resulting in a 
diminution of the service value or productiveness 
thereof. 
In addition to compensation for the loss of the 
property taken measured in terms of the fair mar-
ket value of such property, justice requires that 
the condemnor be further compensated through an 
award for (a) the amount of physical'damages suf-
fered and (b) for all such loss, if any, as may be 
suffered by reason of a diminution in value, due 
to the severances, of the property remaining after 
the severance. This doctrine is supported by the 
great weight of authority. 
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Id. at 333. 
Similarly, in City of Thibodaux v. Louisiana Power & 
Light Co., supra, the federal district court held that severance 
damages must be awarded where part of an integrated public util-
ity system is condemned, and the remainder is thereby made less 
useful. 225 F.Supp. at 661. In describing the damaging effect 
of the partial taking of the electric utility's distribution 
lines on the remainder of its system, the court stated as 
follows: 
[i]n the City of Thibodaux proper the only tangi-
ble equipment of Power Company is its ultimate 
distribution system made up principally of lights, 
poles, and wiring. The condemnation involved in 
this action is limited to the corporate limits of 
the City. However, outside of the corporate lim-
its are the generators and sub-stations of Power 
Company which supply the power to the lines and 
poles within the corporate limits. These 
extra-urban facilities . . . are extensive in size 
and diversification, and are, in fact, what give 
the intra-urban facilities their value. . . . the 
expropriation will render useless, in some degree, 
the extra-urban facilities of the Power Company 
which had formerly supplied the power to the 
intra-urban facilities. 
Id. Accord, City of Newark v. Delmarva Power & Light, Civil No. 
83C-JL-1Q, slip op. (Del. Super. May 21, 1985) (recognizing elec-
tric utility's right to severance damages for partial condemna-
tion of distribution facilities in annexed areas); City of Fresno 
v. San Joaquin Light & Power Corp., 19 P.U.R. (N.S.) 73, 83 
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(1936) (electric utility entitled to damages to physical plant 
which is rendered temporarily less useful or idle after the tak-
ing of its distribution facilities within city limits). 
Logan has expropriated only a part of UP&Lfs distribu-
tion network. The distribution lines serving the annexed custom-
ers were physically connected to the substations and generating 
facilities for which UP&L received no compensation. These sub-
stations, distribution and generation facilities were part of a 
single operating unit, and each component was essential to UP&L's 
service to the annexed customers. Had Logan proceeded by condem-
nation, the above authorities would clearly require it to compen-
sate UP&L for severance damages to its remaining facilities. 
Logan cannot avoid this constitutional requirement simply by pro-
ceeding under Section 424. 
3. The Authority Delegated To Municipalities In The Utah 
Constitution To Furnish Local Utility Services Does Not 
Limit UP&Lfs Right To Just Compensation. 
The district court based its ruling on a determination 
that if Logan had to pay for more than the physical facilities 
within the annexed area, the economic burden would deny Logan its 
"constitutional right" to provide utility service to its resi-
dents. In his Memorandum Decision, Judge Chri'stopherson stated: 
An award of such compensation would make it eco-
nomically unfeasible for any municipality to supply the 
electrical utilities to customers in the annexed area. 
This effectively denies them their constitutional right 
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to supply electrical services to those that may become 
citizen's of the municipality by means of annexation. 
R. 497. See also Finding of Fact No. 7, R. 516. 
The district court's decision elevates the powers of 
municipally owned utility systems above the fundamental rights of 
individual property owners. Apparently, the district court was 
referring to Article XI, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution, 
which delegates to cities the authority to operate local utility 
systems. This provision, however, is not a grant of constitu-
tional "rights" in the sense of an individual's constitutional 
rights. 
The exercise of governmental power by Logan to take or 
damage UP&L's private property falls squarely within the scope of 
Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution and the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Article 
XI, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution cannot be construed as 
giving a municipality the right to take private property without 
just compensation. See Hughes Tool Co. v. Superior Court, 91 
Ariz. 154, 370 P*2d 646, 649 (1962) (interpreting state constitu-
tion as permitting municipality to take or damage land without 
paying compensation violated Fourteenth Amendment). 
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B. The Constitutional Measure Of Valuation. 
1. The Standard Formula For Compensation For The Taking Of 
An Electrical Distribution System Is Reproduction Cost 
New Less Depreciation Of The Distribution Facilities 
Plus The Going Concern Value (Including The Franchise) 
Of The Business Plus Severance Damages To The Remaining 
Facilities. 
Recent cases involving municipal takeover of electric 
distribution systems (but not related transmission and generation 
facilities) have established that the utility is constitutionally 
entitled to four separate areas of compensation: 
L Reproduction cost new less depreciation of the 
distribution facilities taken or rendered 
useless; 
2. Going concern value of the business taken; 
3. The value of the utility's franchise; and 
4. Severance damages to the remaining facilities. 
See City of Thibodeaux, 225 F. Supp. at 670; City of Newark v. 
Delmarva Power & Light Co., slip op. at 4. In re City of Redding 
1919F P.U.R. 415 (Cal. R.R. Comm'n 1919) provides an example of 
the formula used in such cases: 
Just Compensation. 
(a) Valuation of physical property plus 
overhead on basis of reproduction cost less 
depreciation. 
(b) Franchise value. 
(c) Going concern including development 
cost. 
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Then 
(a) + (b) + (c) = "Fair Value of Property" 
Plus 
(d) Severance damages. 
Then 
(a) + (b) + (c) + (d) = "Just Compensation." 
Id. at 420. 
In the present case, UP&L presented unrebutted evidence 
of the compensation it would have received based upon the minimum 
constitutional standard. That evidence was summarized in Exhibit 
D-10 as follows? 
Alternative Compensation 
(Under Eminent Domain) 
1. Market Value - Distribution $ 117,000 
2. Severance Damage - Substation 5,405 
3. Severance Damage - Generation 127,007 
4. Going Concern Value 94,156 
5. Total $ 343,568 
At the very least, UP&L was entitled to this measure of 
compensation. 
2. Going Concern Valuation, Including the Franchise. 
As noted above, the cases involving the condemnation of 
utility properties make it clear that UP&L is entitled to 
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something more than compensation for "the bare bones" of its 
distribution facilities taken or rendered useless by Logan. 
According to Nichols: 
. • . compensation is not limited to the bare 
bones of the plant, its physical properties . . . 
nor to what it would cost to reproduce each of its 
physical features. The value, in fairness and 
justice, must include whatever is contributed by 
the fact that these items are connected and con-
stitute a complete and operating plant. The dif-
ference in value between a dead plant and a live 
one is represented by what is known as the "going 
value". 
4A Nichols, The Law of Eminent Domain § 15.44. See also City of 
Phoenix v. Consolidated Water Co., 415 P.2d 866, 868 (Ariz. 
1966); Dade County v. General Waterworks Corp., 267 So.2d 633, 
639 (Fla. 1972). 
In the present case, going concern value must include 
the value of UP&L's Cache County franchise giving it the right to 
serve the annexed territory, which has twenty-six years remain-
ing. A franchise obtained by an electric utility from the appro-
priate prior governmental entity is a property right which may be 
terminated or modified by an annexing municipality only through 
due process of law. Mountain States Tel. &. Tel. Co. v. Town of 
Belen, 56 N.M. 415, 244 P.2d 1112, 1120 (1952); Town of Coushatto 
v. Valley Electric Membership Corp., 139 So.2d 822, 830 (La. App. 
1962). 
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As to franchise value, Nichols states: 
[i]t is well settled that the franchise of a pub-
lic service corporation is property which must be 
paid for, unless it is expressly provided in the 
statute by which the franchise is granted and that 
it need not be. . . . the reasonable value of the 
franchise taken or the extent to which it has been 
damaged is ordinarily the measure of damages, 
4A Nichols, The Law of Eminent Domain S 15.42. 
Valuation of a franchise or going concern based upon 
ability to produce income has been approved by courts in cases 
involving the taking of electrical distribution systems. 
Delmarva, slip op. at 4; City of Thibodaux, 225 F.Supp. at 667. 
In the present case, UP&Lfs evidence, unrebutted by Logan, demon-
strated that going concern value and franchise value, expressed 
in terms of the ability to produce income, equalled at least 
$94,156.00. 
3. Severance Damage Valuation. 
As noted above, the constitutional requirement of just 
compensation requires that UP&L receive compensation for damages 
to its remaining facilities caused by the severance of the 
annexed customers from its system. The authorities recognize 
several approaches for calculating severance damages in a partial 
taking of a utility. According to Nichols, courts may consider 
the depreciation in the market value of the remaining facilities, 
the degree to which the remaining facilities are rendered useless 
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or will require rehabilitation, and any increase in capital costs 
that will be imposed upon the utility's remaining operations. 4A 
Nichols, The Law of Eminent Domain § 15.45. 
In the present case, UP&L presented evidence of its 
incurred unavoidable costs attributable to its idled generation 
facilities and substations. These amounts equalled $127,007 for 
generation and $5,405 for substations. (The amounts were not 
controverted by any evidence Logan presented.) Even the most 
narrow view of severance damages would permit UP&L to recover 
those amounts because (1) they represent the costs UP&L will con-
tinue to incur until its idled facilities can be absorbed through 
load growth elsewhere in the system, and (2) UP&L will lose the 
revenues to cover those costs as a direct result of the 
severance. 
III. SECTION 424 DOES NOT ALLOW A MUNICIPALITY TO ACQUIRE OWNER-
SHIP OF A UTILITY COMPANY'S PROPERTY. 
The trial court's ruling that Logan is entitled to own-
ership of UP&L's facilities located within the annexed area under 
Section 424 is not supported by the plain language of the stat-
ute. Section 424 does not give the annexing municipality owner-
ship of the utility's distribution facilities located in the 
annexed area. 
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Private ownership of property is not interfered with 
lightly* Under Utah law, power of the government to acquire own-
ership of private property without the consent of the owner must 
be expressly provided for by statute. This Court has previously 
stated: 
[P]rivate property shall not be taken or dam-
aged except for purposes of public utility 
and for adequate compensation. This preroga-
tive is only allowed where the letter of the 
law permits it and then only under careful 
observance of the rules prescribed for the 
protection of the owner. 
Moyle v. Salt Lake City, 111 Utah 201, 176 P.2d 882, 885 (1947) 
(emphasis added). See also 1A Nichols, The Law of Eminent Domain 
§ 3*213 (1985 edo)0 Thus, in Great Salt Lake Authority v. Island 
Ranching Co., 18 Utah 2d 276, 421 P.2d 504 (1966), this Court 
held that a statute did not invest a governmental entity with 
power to condemn property on Antelope Island where the statute 
listed several means by which the entity could acquire the prop-
erty, but did not expressly authorize condemnation. 421 P.2d at 
505-506. See also Bertagnoli v. Baker, 117 Utah 348, 215 P.2d 
626, 628 (1950) (right of eminent domain strictly construed 
because infringes on rights of individual ownership of property). 
Nothing in Section 424 refers to acquisition of prop-
erty by the municipality through compulsory means or otherwise. 
The only right Section 424 grants a municipality is the right "to 
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furnish its electric utility services" to electrical consumers 
within the annexed area. Utah Code Ann. S 10-2-424. If the leg-
islature had intended Section 424 to grant municipalities the 
power to condemn and acquire ownership of a utility's property, 
it could have so provided in the statute. See, e.g., 18 Okla. 
St. Ann. § 437.2(k)(1986) (authorizing annexing municipality to 
"acquire" rural electrical cooperative's distribution facilities 
in annexed area). 
The fact that Section 424 does not entitle Logan to 
ownership of UP&L's local distribution facilities does not, how-
ever, diminish UP&L's right to just compensation. There is noth-
ing inconsistent with awarding UP&L a full measure of compensa-
tion without also awarding Logan ownership of the facilities. As 
this Court has stated: 
In earlier times it was held that property could be 
deemed to be taken, within the meaning of constitu-
tional provisions, only when the owner was wholly 
deprived of its possession, use, and occupation. But a 
more liberal doctrine has long been established, and an 
actual, physical taking of property is not necessary to 
entitle its owner to compensation. A man's property 
may be taken, within the meaning of constitutional pro-
visions such as ours, although his title and posses-
sional remain undisturbed. To deprive him of the ordi-
nary beneficial use and enjoyment of his property is, 
in law, equivalent to the taking of it, and is as much 
a taking as though the property itself were actually 
taken. Authorities to this effect are numerous, and 
this principle of law has become embodied in many 
Constitutions (taken or damaged) and in many statutes. 
It is so with respect to our own. 
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Oregon Short Line Ry. Co. v. Jones, 29 Utah 147, 80 P. 732, 734) 
(1905) (emphasis added). 
Logan's replacement of UP&L as the supplier of elec-
tricity to the annexed areas deprived UP&L of the beneficial use 
of its property. UP&L is entitled to just compensation for those 
facilities even though it retains legal title to them. 
CONCLUSION 
This case involves an issue of great importance to UP&L 
and its ratepayers: Who is to bear the cost of municipal expan-
sion into areas previously served by a public utility? UP&L has 
made a significant investment in its substations and generating 
facilities in order to satisfy its statutory mandate to provide 
reliable electrical service to its customers throughout the state 
of Utah. The Utah Legislature enacted Section 424 to protect 
public utilities and their ratepayers from being unfairly bur-
dened with the cost of facilities that are made useless or less 
useful as a result of municipal expansion. Interpreting the sec-
tion to compensate UP&L only for its local distribution lines is 
erroneous and is contrary to law. 
Moreover, the district court's interpretation of Sec-
tion 424 violates the constitutional requirement that UP&L 
receive just compensation for its expropriated business as well 
as damages for its remaining facilities. 
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Accordingly, this Court should reverse the decision of 
the district court. The district court should be directed to 
award UP&L $434,987, representing the uncontroverted fair market 
value of its dedicated facilities, and order that the local 
distribution facilities be returned to UP&L. Alternatively, UP&L 
requests this Court to establish $343,568 as the minimum amount 
of compensation to which UP&L is entitled under the United States 
and Utah Constitutions for the taking of its distribution 
facilities, for going concern value and for severance damages. 
DATED this ^ * % day of February 1989. 
W. Cullen Battle 
Douglas J. Payne 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
A Professional Corporation 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this o * \ day of February 
1989, I caused four true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Appellant to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
W. Scott Barrett 
City of Logan 
255 North Main Street 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Appendix A 
FKAJ&CHJSE SUPPLEMENT NO. 271 
(Conpdatkm of Jannery h l f l l ) 
CACHE COUNTY, UTAH 
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY 
(General Electric Service) 
Passed September 13, 1966; expires AtfUJ* 5. 2016. 
Granted to Utah Power 4 Light Company. 
Validity approved: General Counsel latter datad February 17, 1967. 
An ordinance granting to Utah Power 4 light Company, its wusawi 
and assigns, an electric light, heat and power franchise. 
The Board of County Commissioners of Cache County, 
Utah, Ordains as Follows: 
Section 1. That there is hereby granted to Utah 
Power & Light Company, its successors and assigns 
(herein called the "Grantee"), the right, privilege, or 
franchise until August 5, 2016, to construct, maintain 
and operate in, along, upon and across the present and 
future roads, highways and public places in Cache 
County, Utah, and its successors, electric light and power 
lines, together with all the necessary or desirable appurt-
enances (including underground conduits, poles, towers, 
wires, transmission lines, and telegraph and telephone 
lines for its own use), for the purpose of transmitting 
and supplying electricity to said County, the inhabitants 
thereof, and persons and corporations beyond the limits 
thereof, for light, heat, power and other purposes. 
Section 2. Poles and towers shall be so erected as 
to interfere as little as possible with traffic over said 
roads and highways. The opening of roads and the erec-
tion of poles and towers shall be controlled by the ordi-
nances of said County, but will not be made so as to 
unreasonably interfere with the proper operation of said 
lines. 
SectioB 3. All lines constructed under this grant 
shall be constructed in accordance with established prac-
tices with respect to electrical construction. 
Section 4. The County shall in no way be liable or 
responsible for any accident or damage that may occur 
in the construction, operation or maintenance by the 
Grantee of its lines and appurtenances hereunder, and 
the acceptance of this franchise shall be deemed an agree-
ment on the part of said Grantee, its successors and 
assigns, to indemnify said County and hold it harmless 
against any and all liability, loss, cost, damage or expense 
*hich may accrue to said County by reason of the neg-
lect, default or misconduct of the Grantee in the con-
struction, operation or maintenance of its lines and 
appurtenances hereunder. 
Section 5. The Grantee shall file its written accep-
tance of this franchise with the County Clerk within 
thirty (30) days after its passage. 
Section 6. This ordinance shall take effect as soon 
as it shall be published, or on the fifteenth day after its 
passage, whichever shall occur later. 
Passed by the County Commissioners of Cache Coun-
ty, Utah, this 13th day of September, 196& 
Todd & Weston 
Chairman of the Board of County Commissioners 
Attest: 
Iver L. Larsen 
County Clerk, Ex-Officio Clerk of 
the Board of County Commissioners 
(SEAL) 
NOTE: Certificate of Convenience and Necessity granted 
by the Public Service Commission of Utah in 
Case No. 5776, Order No. 1581, dated January 
26,1967, covers this franchise. 
Appendix B 
BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE C O M SSI ON OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Application 
of UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY 
for a Certificate of Convenience 
and Necessity to Exercise the 
Rights and Privileges Conferred 
by Franchise Granted by Cache 
County, Utah. 
Case No. 5776 
O R D E R 
Certificate of Convenience 
and Necessity No. 1581 
This case being at issue upon application on file and 
having been duly heard and submitted by the parties hereto, and 
full investigation of the matters and things involved having 
been had, and the Commission having on the date hereof, made and 
filed a Report containing its findings and conclusions, which 
Report is hereby referred to and made a part hereof: 
IT IS ORDERED that Utah Power & Light Company is hereby 
granted Certificate of Convenience and Necessity No. 1581 authoriz-
ing it to exercise the rights and privileges conferred by franchise 
ordinance dated September 13, 1966, by Cache County, Utah. 
Dated this 26th day of January , 1967. 
(Seal) 
ATTEST: 
?/ C, ?, PfSHSBAW. JB. 
C. R. OPENSHAW, JR. 
Secretary 
s/ DONALD HACKING 
DONALD HACKING, Chairman 
s/ HAL S. BENNETT 
HAL S. BENNETT, Commissioner 
s/ D. FRANK WILKINS 
D. FRANK WILK1NS, Commissioner 
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1ST CASE of Level 1 printed in FULL format. 
CITY of NEWARK, a municipal corporation of the state of 
Delaware Plaintiff, v. DELMARVA POWER and LISHT CO., a 
Delaware corporation Defendant. 
Civil Action No. 83C-JL-10 
Superior Court of Delaware, New Castle County 
Slip Opinion 
January 22, 1985, Submitted 
May 21, 1985, Decided 
City of Newark's Motion for Partial Judgment of the Pleadings under Rule 
12(c). Denied. 
Thomas G. Hughes, Esquire of O'Donnell and Hughes, P.A., Wilmington for 
Plaintiff. 
Richard fc. Poole, Esquire and Gregory A. Inskip, Esquire of Potter Anderson 
and Corroon, Wilmington for Defendant and Dale 6. Stoodley of Delmarva Power and 
Light Company. 
UNREPORTED OPINION 
ORDER 
This 21st day of May 1985, 
The Court having before it a Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings 
filed by the City of Newark ("Newark") and having considered the parties1 
respective positions and the applicable law hereby denies said application for 
reasons articulated herein: 
1) Newark's Motion, filed pursuant to Super. Ct. R. Civ. Pro. 12(c), is now 
properly one for Summary Judgment under Super. Ct. R. Civ. Pro. 56, the parties 
having submitted matters outside the pleadings; and the Court rules on it as a 
Summary Judgment Motion. 
2) The incontroverted facts are that Newark seeks to condemn property 
(i.e., lines, poles, and other tangible property) of Delmarva Power & 
Light Co. (" Delmarva" ) so that it can supplant Delmarva in providing 
electricity distribution service to the residences at 825, 903, and 907 South 
College Avenue in Newark (Rte. 896), properties which were annexed by Newark 
in 1977. Delmarva challenges Newark's right to condemn the property, alleging 
violations of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 
I, Section 8 of the Delaware Constitution. Specifically, Delmarva asserts that 
Newark has demonstrated no valid public purpose nor has it provided just 
compensation for the taking. Delmarva argues that Newark should compensate it 
not only for Delmarva*s personal property but also for the value of Delmarva's 
franchise and related rights; the going concern value and goodwill value of 
its service to the three customers of 825, 903, and 907 South College Avenue; 
and severance damages. Newark, in turn, asserts that Delmarva has no franchise 
claim which would entitle it to compensation for loss of customers. 
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3) Newark's Motion for Sumary Judgment may be granted only if, after a 
consideration of the evidence In the light most favorable to Delmarva, the Court 
concludes that Newark is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and there are 
no material issues of fact present. Moore v. Sliemore, Del.Supr., 405 A.2d 679 
(1979); Bradford, Inc. v. Travelers Indemnity Co., Del.Super., 301 A.2d 519 
(1972). 
4) The Court is satisfied that the instant condemnation action is a valid use 
of Newark's power of eminent domain and that Newark has demonstrated that the 
taking in question is for a public purpose. Newark operates under a Home Rule 
Charter enacted in 1965 and as authorized by 22 Oel.C. 8 802. Section 405 of 
that charter provides in pertinent part: 
The city shall have the right to acquire the properties and rights of utility 
companies, and further shall have, if it wishes to so exercise, the exclusive 
right to provide water, sewer and electrical utility service within the 
corporate limits of the city as they presently exist or shall in the future be 
extended by annexation; provided, however, that in acquiring such utility 
properties, whether by purchase, condemnation or other means, the city shall, in 
all respects, adhere to the general laws of the State of Delaware; and provided 
further that nothing in this section shall authorize the acquisition by the city 
of any through electric transmission lines. 
By Resolution No. 83-1, dated March 28, 1983, the Newark City Council 
authorized the institution of the instant condemnation action. Furthermore, it 
is settled law that furnishing power to householders is a public purpose, Mt. 
Vemon-Uoodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Alabama Interstate Power Co., 240 U.S. 30 
(1916); Duck River Electric Membership Corp. v. Manchester, Tenn.Supr., 529 
S.U.2d 202 (1975), and that a municipality may exercise its eminent domain power 
to take the private property of a public service utility for public use. Long 
Island Water Supply Co. v. The City of Brooklyn, 166 U.S. 685 (1897); Shakopee 
v. Minn, valley Electric Cooperative, Minn.Supr., 303 N.U.2d 58 (1981). See 
also University of Delaware v. City of Newark, Del.Ch., C.A. No. 4760, Qui lien, 
Ch. (November 25, 1975). 
5) The Court is also satisfied that Delmarva possesses a franchise to supply 
and distribute electric power to the households in question and that it should 
be compensated for the taking of that franchise. Newark asserts that Delmarva 
has no franchise claim which would entitle it to compensation for the loss of 
customers, contending that Delmarva possesses, at best, a "limited" or "special" 
franchise to erect poles and wires on public streets, which franchise is not 
Interfered with by the taking of the service to three households. Newark's 
argument, however, fails on either of two independent grounds. First, the Court 
holds that the franchise granted by the State through action of the Levy Court 
of New Castle County in 1924 to the American Power Co. (predecessor company to 
Delmarva), which grants the right "to erect, perpetually maintain and operate 
its lines . . ." (emphasis added), Includes the right to distribute electricity. 
See generally Greater Wilmington Transportation Authority v. Kline, Del.Super., 
285 A.2d 819 (1971). This franchise right, which would be partially destroyed 
by Newark's assumption of service to three of Delmarva*s customers, may not 
constitutionally be taken without just compensation. See Nonongahela Navigation 
Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893). City of Thlbodaux v. Louisiana Power 
& Light Co., 225 F. Supp. 657 (E.D. La. 1963), aff'd in pertinent part, 373 F.2d 
870 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 389 U.S. 975 (1967); Mississippi Power & Light Co. 
v. City of Clarksdale, Mlss.Supr., 288 So.2d 9 (1973). Second, Newark is 
f ATY7C JtfmTITfC f ATITIC NTY!* 
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collaterally estopped from claiming that Deimarva has no compensable franchise 
claim by virtue of the finding of Chancellor Seitr in prior litigation between 
the parties that Delaware Power & Light Co., also a predecessor company to 
Deimarva, Hhas been and is exercising a definite franchise to distribute 
electricity which was granted by the State.- Delaware Power & Light Co. v. city 
of Newark, Del.Ch., 140 A.2d 2S8, 261 (1958). See Tyndall v. Tyndall, 
Del.Supr., 238 A.2d 343 (1968); Chrysler Corp. v. New Castle County, Del.Super., 
464 A.2d 75 (1983). 
6) Moving established that Delaarva is entitled to compensation for its 
persona, property as well as the loss of its franchise rights with respect to 
the three customers whose service Newark seeks to acquire through these 
condemnation proceedings, the remaining issue concerns the eeasure of 
compensation. Although traditionally in a condemnation of real estate the 
value of a business to the owner is not admissible to prove just compensation, 
this is not the case where a public utility is directly taken over by a 
condemning authority for operation. State v. Davis Concrete of Delaware, Inc., 
Del.Supr., 355 A.2d 883 (1976); Restaurants, Inc. v. City of Wilmington, 
Del.Supr., 274 A.2d 137 (1971); City of Thi-bodaux, supra at 662. In such cases 
fair market value, the traditional measure of condemnation damages, is 
extremely difficult to establish since evidence of similar sales in the area is 
nonexistent, but where "it is the •.isiness tfsplf uhlcb u se4Mdy U must be 
valued in the only way businesses can be value*, ke-. according to its ability, 
to produce jjoxoje." city of Thlbadaux, supra at 667. In the case at bar 
Deimarva is entitled to compensation for the value of the property taken, 
which includes the loss of business resulting from a partial taking of its 
franchise rights, as well as severance damages. See Orgal, Valuation Under 
Eminent Domain 8 223 (1953). Compensation for the loss of business entitles 
Deimarva to present evidence of going concern value of the part of the 
business taken by Newark, City of Thlbadaux, supra at 667. Deimarva's severance 
damage claim permits it to present evidence of the damage to the remainder of 
its franchise by virtue of the taking. 0.089 of an Acre of Land in New Castle 
Hundred, New Castle County v. State, Del. Supr., 145 A.2d 76 (1958); Board of 
Education of Claynont Special School District v. 13 Acres of Land in Brandywine 
Huundred, Del. Super., 131 A.2d 180 (1957). Finally, Deimarva may present 
evidence of the loss of franchise growth, since at the time its predecessor 
company was granted a franchise in 1924, that grant was not made subject to an 
overriding power of eminent domain of a municipality or other entity. See City 
of Thlbodaux, supra (5th Clr.) at 874. 
7) Pursuant to the foregoing, Newark's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
LEXIS? NEXIS LEXIS? NEXI 
